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Abstract 
The future applications of terahertz (THz) wireless communication require investigations on link 
secrecy performance in all kinds of atmospheric conditions, including fog, snow, rain and 
atmospheric turbulence. Here, we present theoretical studies on physical layer security of 
point-to-point THz and infrared (IR) wireless links in atmospheric turbulence with a potential 
eavesdropper outside of the link path. Attenuations due to turbulence, gaseous absorption and beam 
divergence are included in the model to predict the propagation of both links. Secrecy capacity and 
outage probability of the THz links are calculated and compared with that of an IR (1550 nm) link. 
Dependences of link security on eavesdropper’s position, atmospheric visibility, turbulence strength 
and intended data transmission rate are also presented and analyzed. We find that the THz link owns 
higher security at physical layer than the IR link. 
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1. Introduction  
Terahertz (THz) communication technique is widely considered as a promising candidate for the next 
generation of wireless networks due to its large data capacity and high security [1, 2], which 
corresponds to its advantages of wider bandwidth and higher beam directionality when compared 
with present radio frequencies (RF) and millimeter waves [3, 4]. It could also be a solution to 
provide reliable data transmission in some special application scenarios, such as in rain, snow, dust 
and atmospheric turbulence, when a wireless link at higher frequencies (such as infrared) is 
prohibited or restricted. Su et. al. [5, 6] compared link performance of a 625 GHz link and an IR 
(1550 nm) link in fog cloud and dust cloud, and proved that the THz link owns much better 
performance due to a small degradation it suffered. Ma et. al. [7] repeated the measurements in 
atmospheric turbulence and also observed a much lower link degradation in THz link due to the 
negligible signal loss by scattering it suffered.  
Unlike wire communications, the broadcasting nature of wireless link makes it to be vulnerable 
to attacks at physical layer. One alternative solution for that is employing carrier beams with higher 
directionality to achieve higher security at physical layer [8]. A point-to-point link with carriers at 
and above THz frequencies is confirmed to provide an additional layer of security when an 
eavesdropper appears between two legitimate peers [1] due to its inherent narrower beam width 
compared to the almost broadcast nature of RF signals [9]. This leads to a high directionality and 
makes it much harder and even impossible to intercept the signals. However, if we consider a visible 
and/or IR link in clear weather, an even much higher link security would be achieved [10-12] 
because of its higher directionality than THz beams. 
In this work, considering the smaller link degradation of THz links by scattering in atmospheric 
turbulence and higher security of IR links due to its high directionality in clear weather, we propose 
to study the secrecy performance of both links in atmospheric turbulence and find out the influencing 
mechanism of scattering by turbulence and inherent beam directionality. This has never been 
investigated before, but a comprehensive study on this topic is definitely required for the future 
applications of THz and even IR wireless communications.  
 
2. Physical Characteristics of Atmospheric Turbulence 
When a THz beam propagates in outside scenarios, it suffers significant absorption by water 
vapor and other gases (such as oxygen) [13, 14], and also attenuation by atmospheric turbulence 
even in rain [15] when wind velocity reaches to one point (the critical Reynolds number equals the 
normal air flow [16]) where turbulence generated. Atmospheric turbulence is caused by spatial and 
temporal temperature inhomogeneities in air [17, 18] and is usually regarded as a large amount of air 
pockets with varying sizes (between a small scale size l0 and a larger scale size L0) and temperatures. 
As shown in Fig. 1(a), these air pockets can act like prisms with different refractive indices and will 
scatter the beam when it propagates through the turbulence. Then random fluctuation of the signal 
power and phasefront distortion occur spatially and temporally [19], and further degrade the link 
performance with lower or higher modulation formats [20, 21]. So, for long paths ( ≥ 1km ) being 
parallel or near to the ground, scattering by atmospheric turbulence can lead to a time-varying fading 
effect on wireless link in the order of milliseconds [22, 23]. 
However, evaluation and characterization of atmospheric turbulence based on theories are very 
challenging and complex, because the observable atmospheric channel quantities such as wind 
velocity, temperature, and pressure are mixed and behave in a nonlinear fashion. Therefore, it should 
be characterized based on statistical distributions. Log-normal distribution model, gamma-gamma 
model, K-distribution model and negative exponential distribution model are usually considered for 
the characterization of the atmospheric turbulence and induced signal fluctuation [24]. But none of 
them is suitable for all the turbulence conditions due to the non-stationary nature of turbulence. 
Predictions by the log-normal model in weak turbulence match well with experimental 
measurements in [7]. This model would also be employed in this work for stochastic characteristic of 
channel fading in weak turbulence. 
There have been several models developed to estimate the average attenuation caused only by 
turbulence. Rytov Method starts on the basis of Rytov’s analysis without receiver aperture considered 
[25]. Andrew’s Method is derived on the basis of a detailed mathematical analysis of atmospheric 
turbulence presented by Larry C. Andrews [25]. Kruse et. al. [26] derived a method which has served 
a long time to the infrared and far-infrared communication community as the only model providing a 
wavelength dependent between the atmospheric turbulence and the attenuation coefficient. It was 
first developed for fog attenuation modeling, and could also be used for atmospheric turbulence [27] 
as 
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here, λ in [μm] is incident wavelength. V in [m] is atmospheric visibility which is defined as a 
distance where the 0.55μm collimated light beam is attenuated to a fraction (5% or 2%) of an 
original power. p is the size distribution of scattering air pockets and can obtain by a piecewise 
function of V in several models. Kruse model is firstly proposed in [28] to preset the relation between 
both and can only be used when visibility V≤1km [29]. Then, Kim modified this model [30] and 
make it to be available over full visibility range as  
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which would be employed for the prediction of link performance with with visibility V≤1km in this 
work. 
 
3. Secrecy capacity 
3.1 Calculation model 
Here, we assume there is a point-to-point outdoor THz link and the configuration is shown in Fig.1 
(b). A transmitter (Alice) sends information to a legitimate receiver (Bob) by a line-of-sight (LOS) 
link which suffers absorption and scattering in atmospheric turbulence. Meanwhile, an eavesdropper 
(Eve) exists outside but near the link path and aims to capture the information through a 
non-line-of-sight (NLOS) channel scattered away from the legitimate (LOS) path. The link distance 
d is set at d=1km in all the calculations, and so, positions of Alice and Bob are always fixed. Eve can 
change its position and adjust its pointing direction to obtain optimal received signal. 
 
Figure 1 (a) Geographic of the point-to-point THz link with a security attacker (Eve) in atmospheric 
turbulence; (b) Coordinate system of the legitimate (LOS) and eavesdropping (NLOS) links. 
  In the presence of atmospheric turbulence, the LOS link suffers atmospheric attenuation GF and 
divergence attenuation  2 24D AG A d   with αA as the full divergence angle of Alice and A as the 
effective receiving area of Bob. The atmospheric attenuation consists of two parts: attenuation only 
by turbulence (with coefficient as αt) and gaseous attenuation (with coefficient as αg ) [31] by air. The 
latter one is commonly described as the sum of spectral absorption link of oxygen, water vapor and a 
water vapor continuum component [24]. So the atmospheric attenuation coefficient is αatm =αt +αg 
and the atmospheric attenuation can be obtained by  expF atmG d  . 
Combining both atmospheric attenuation and divergence attenuation, we can get the total LOS 
link gain as  
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To obtain the link gain of the eavesdropping (NLOS) link achieved by scattering, a widely used 
model, called single-scattering model [32, 33], is employed. In the link geometry shown in Fig. 1(b), 
we set Alice at the origin of the coordinate (0, 0), Bob at (d, 0) and Eve at (x, y). The signal is 
transmitted along the positive direction of the x-axis between Alice and Bob. The NLOS link gain 
GNLOS can be obtained as in [34] by 
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with integral variable l as the signal transmission distance before scattering occurs. The lower bound 
La and upper bound Lb, expressed as 
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divide the scattering region. Here, α represents the scattering angel of Eve, which means the point 
angle from scattering point (l, 0) to Eve (x, y). The optimal scattering angle, corresponding to 
maximum NLOS link gain, can be expressed as  * = arctan 2y x  for 2 2    [27]. 
The parameter β represents full angle of field of sight (FOV) of Bob. Ω(l) denotes the solid angle 
from receiving area to the scattering point 
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The factor p(μ) can be expressed as 
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when generalized Henyey-Greenstein function is adopted, and it is defined as scattering phase 
function indicating the probability distribution of scattering angle.    
2 2x l x l y    
represents the cosine of scattering angle in (l, 0) with g as an asymmetry factor related to wavelength, 
scattering particle radius and refractive index [35].  
 
3.2 Secrecy performance analysis 
In the calculation, a 300 GHz link and a 1550 nm link are considered and assumed to be 
collimated with the same beam width. The FOV angles of Eve for both links are set to be 30° and the 
receiving areas for Bob and Eve are all 1cm
2
. To calculate the gaseous attenuation αg, we set 
temperature T = 25
o
C, pressure P = 1013 hPa, and relative humidity RH = 60%, which are all chosen 
in the following calculations. When Eve is set at a position of (200m, 10m), the link gain is 
calculated and shown in Fig. 2. Solid lines represent the evolution of link gain GLOS for the LOS link 
as a function of atmospheric visibility V. It increases as the increasing of atmospheric visibility due 
to the decreasing of attenuation by turbulence αt, which reaches to 0 when V > 1km for the THz link 
and when V > 3km for the IR link. This indicates that the THz link suffers less attenuation by the 
turbulence. The dashed lines represent the variation of NLOS link gain GNLOS, which is larger than 
the LOS link gain GLOS first due to the serious scattering by strong atmospheric turbulence. Then it 
decreases gradually with the increasing of visibility because of the decreasing of atmospheric 
attenuation. When V = 0.5km, an intersection between both gains comes for the THz link, Bob and 
Eve can obtain the same link gain and the secrecy risk comes for the THz link. For the IR link, that 
comes when V = 0.6km. This indicates that the THz link is less vulnerable to attack due to 
turbulence.  
 
 Figure 2 Link gain of the legitimate (LOS) and eavesdropping (NLOS) channels with respect to 
atmospheric visibility V. (Temperature T = 25
o
C, Pressure P = 1013 hPa, and relative humidity RH = 
60%). 
 
Secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum data rate from Alice to Bob when perfect secrecy 
performance is maintained [36] and can be expressed as  
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with    max 0,x x

 indicating that the secrecy capacity can never be less than 0. Parameters X, Y 
and Z represents the signals of the Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively. I(X;Y) and I(X;Z) denote the 
mutual information of LOS and NLOS links [37], respectively, and can be expressed as  
     ; ( ) log log ( ) logL b L b b b L b L bI X Y q q q               （ ）     (10) 
     ; ( ) log log ( ) logN b N b b b N b N bI X Z q q q               （ ）   (11) 
when an on-off keying modulation format with a duty cycle q and a Poisson distribution, which is a 
common assumption for stochastic links, are assumed. LOSL pG P E  and NLOSN pG P E   
represent the mean numbers of detected photoelectrons of signal component in each slot for the LOS 
and NLOS links, respectively. P is the output power from Alice and η is the receiver efficiency, 
which are identical for Bob and Eve and are always set at P = 1 W, η = 0.1 in the calculation. Ep is 
the energy of one THz or IR photon and τ is integration time of the receivers of Bob and Eve. λb 
represent the mean number of detected photoelectrons of background radiation component in each 
slot. In experimental measurement, the infrared radiation (sometimes called laser beam) is converted 
to electrical power by photovoltaics; and the THz radiation is converted to direct current (DC) 
electrical power using a rectifying diode and an antenna. Both methods are based on the conversion 
of photoelectron to current. So here, we take the photoelectron in consideration in our calculation 
and the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of receiver can be obtained by dividing λL by λb. 
The secrecy capacity distributions with respect to arbitrary positions of Eve are calculated and 
shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b) when the atmospheric visibility V = 0.5km. The color bars on the right 
denote the safe transmission rates in Gbps, which increases gradually as the color changes from blue 
to yellow. In Fig. 3(a) for the THz link, the dark blue region represents Cs = 0, which means the 
secure transmission cannot be guaranteed if Eve is located in this region. We could call it as insure 
region. However, in Fig. 3(b) for the IR link, the whole region is in dark blue and insecure due to the 
higher scattering suffered by the IR link. For the THz wave at 300 GHz, its wavelength is around 650 
times larger than the IR wavelength. This makes the THz link suffers less signal scattering effect by 
the atmospheric turbulence, which has been confirmed in experimental measurements [7]. In Fig. 3(c) 
and (d), when the visibility is increased to V= 0.6km, the secrecy of both links are increased. The 
insecure region of the THz link disappears and the safe data transmission rate of the IR link could 
never be 0 in the whole region. 
   
  
Figure 3 Secrecy capacity distribution for 2-D positions of Eve when (a) 300 GHz link with V = 0.5 
km, (b) 1550 nm link with V = 0.5 km, (c) 300 GHz link with V = 0.6 km and (d) 1550 nm link with 
V = 0.6 km are chosen.  
 
If we consider commercial products for the generation of THz and IR signals, the divergence 
angle should be 10
o
 for THz link [38] and 15 mrad for IR link [39]. Then we do the same calculation 
as in Fig. 3 and set a larger visibility V = 0.7km to reduce the atmospheric attenuation and increase 
link gain. The secrecy capacity distribution is plotted in Fig. 4. In Fig. 4(a), the insecure region (dark 
blue region) moves closer to Bob when compared with Fig. 3(a) or (c). We attribute this to the larger 
coverage of the THz beam due to its larger divergence angle we assumed. The insecure region of the 
IR link in Fig. 4(b) is reduced and the safe transmission rate can be above 0, but it is still much below 
that of the THz link.   
To further see the variation of secrecy performance at different carrier frequencies, we choose 
100 GHz and 200 GHz links for calculation which are not that far away from the 300 GHz at the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Under the same parameter settings (such as divergence angle, visibility 
and link distance) with Fig. 4(a) , the secrecy capacity distributions of both links are plotted in Fig. 
4(c) and (d). From the comparison of Fig. 4(a), (c) and (d), we can see that the 100 GHz and 200 
GHz links own the higher security corresponding to smaller insecure region. And the area of the 
region becomes larger for higher frequencies due to more serious scattering and higher gaseous 
attenuation it suffered. So if we hope to increase the security of a THz wireless link, small 
divergence angle and/or carrier frequency should be efficient methods. 
   
 Figure 4 Secrecy capacity distribution for 2-D positions of Eve when (a) 300 GHz, (b) 1550 nm, (c) 
100 GHz and (d) 200 GHz links are chosen with visibility V = 0.7 km. 
 
4. Outage probability  
4.1 Calculation model 
In the calculation of secrecy capacity in Section 3, only averaged atmospheric attenuation can be 
calculated in the theoretical model and so the link gain is an averaged value also. But this is not the 
actual situation. The received signal power and link gain should fluctuate spatially and temporally 
due to the scattering induced scintillation effect along the link paths [40]. So in this section, we 
introduce random fluctuations and a stochastic characterization to the LOS link, while the NLOS link 
gain is still considered as a constant due to the fact that the scattered signal power received by Eve 
could never be comparable to or larger than the LOS gain. Otherwise, the LOS link would fail due to 
a serious power loss. The NLOS link gain should be always much smaller than the LOS link gain 
and random fluctuations of it would have almost no influence on the secrecy performance of the 
whole link. 
To depict the signal distribution in weak turbulence, the log-normal model is regarded a perfect 
tool for the theoretical model [41] and secrecy outage probability is employed here as a probabilistic 
indicator to characterize the link secrecy. It is defined as the probability that the instantaneous 
secrecy capacity falls below a target rate which can be expressed as [42] 
   0 r sP R P C R           (12) 
with R is the given minimal secure transmission rate (R ≥ 0). It is usually regarded as the probability 
of existence of a secure link. Eq. (12) can be rewritten as 
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with G as the solution of Cs = R and GLOS as the instantaneous LOS link gain in this section. The 
probability density function of the instantaneous LOS link gain can then be expressed by [16] 
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Here, LOSG is the mean value of random variable GLOS.  LOS LOSlog G G  is the mean value of 
 LOS LOSlog G G  and can be written as   2LOS LOSlog 2rG G   . The parameter 2r  represents 
the variance of log(GLOS). In the presence of atmosphere turbulence, 
2
r  is defined as Rytov 
variance characterizing the strength of turbulence over a transmission link employing an infinite 
plane wave. 2 2 7 6 11 61.23r nC k d   is a function of atmosphere refraction structure parameter 
2
nC , the 
wave number 2k   , and the link distance d. In terms of this parameter, we choose 2 1r   as 
the characterization of weak turbulence [25]. 
 
4.2 Secrecy performance analysis 
Under the settings of V = 0.6 km, d = 1 km and SNR=3dB of the receiver, the variation of outage 
probability of the 300 GHz link is calculated and plotted in Fig.5 with turbulence strength and intended 
transmission data rate are considered, which could also influence the outage probability. The Rytov 
variance is set around 0.1 and 0.5 belonging to weak turbulence for the THz link. Fig. 5(a) plots the 
evolution of outage probability with respect to the position of Eve on x-axis along y = 15m. For a 
given turbulence strength and transmission data rate, with the increasing of x value, the outage 
probability increases significantly first and reaches maximum when x-value is around 200m; then it 
decreases always. This trend is consistent with the performance plotted in Fig. 3(a) and (c) where a 
collimated beam is considered. When Eve is near Alice, the scattered power could not be enough for 
decoding, and when Eve is near Bob, the scattering cannot be enough also due to the narrow beam 
width and large gaseous attenuation.  
In Fig. 5(b), the outage probability is plotted versus the position of Eve on y-axis along x = 200m. 
With the increasing of y value, the outage probability decreases remarkably because of the increasing 
of gaseous absorption. Fig. 5(c) shows the evolution of outage probability with respect to 
atmospheric visibility when Eve is positioned at (500m, 5m). The outage probability decreases 
significantly with the increasing of visibility due to the decreasing of scattering effect and 
corresponding eavesdropping link gain. Fig. 5(d) shows that the outage probability is very sensitive 
to the carrier frequency and the THz link could be definitely insecure when a 500 GHz frequency 
employed under Rytov variance at 2 0.5r   and intended data rate R = 10 Gbps. 
When we look back to the first three plots in Fig. 5, by comparing the blue and red curves, we 
can see that the outage probability increases dramatically under stronger turbulence; by comparing the 
solid and dashed curves, we can find that larger intended data rate could reduce the link security due to 
the larger SNR the link required.  
 
 
(a)                                        (b) 
  
(c)                                        (d) 
Figure 5 Variation of outage probability with respect to Eve’s position on (a) x-axis and (b) 
y-axis; Variation of outage probability versus atmospheric visibility under (c) different turbulence 
strengths and intended data rates and (d) carrier frequencies.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of point-to-point THz and IR links in 
atmospheric turbulence when an eavesdropper locates outside of the link path. A theoretical model 
combining atmospheric attenuation, scattering theories and stochastic models are proposed to predict 
the secrecy capacity distribution and outage probability. The calculation results show that, compared 
with an IR link at 1550nm, the THz link at 300 GHz own higher security even with a much larger 
divergence angle at transmitter side being assumed. At THz range, larger insecure regions and larger 
outage probabilities are also observed at higher THz frequencies due to the serious link degradations 
caused by turbulence induced scattering effect. And the security at physical layer becomes even 
worse when turbulence strength and/or transmitted data rate increase. 
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